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Abstract
We analyse a (diﬀerentiated good) industry where an incumbent ﬁrm owns a
network good (essential input) and faces potential competition in the (downstream)
retail market. Unlike the traditional approach, we consider a scenario where the
decision to compete or not in the downstream segment is endogenous, and this
decision depends on the particular mechanism designed by the utilitarian regula-
tor. We assume that the technology of the potential entrant is private information.
We derive the eﬃcient (Ramsey) prices and access charge taking the impact of a
non-discriminatory mechanism on entry decision into account. We assert that the
optimal pricing formula must include a Ramsey term that is inversely related to the
“modiﬁed” superelasticty of the retail good under consideration. We further show,
under unknown cost, that there might be “excess” or “too little” entry compared
to the socially optimal level.
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This paper concentrates on regulated industries where the supply of ﬁnal goods and
services to consumers requires the use of an essential input. An essential input may
be a facility or an infrastructure. It is used to enable competing ﬁrms to serve their
ﬁnal customers and cannot be cheaply duplicated. Often essential facility constitutes a
bottleneck in the production chain. Examples of such bottleneck inputs are local loop
(telecommunications), transmission grid (electricity), pipelines (gas), tracks and stations
(rail transportation) and local delivery network (postal services).1 The owner of such
an input has incentives to use its dominant position to monopolize the complementary
segments of the market. Therefore, to introduce competition in some market segments of
these industries, for examples for long distance calls, electricity generation, gas extraction,
rail and freight services or the production of presorted mail, the competitors should be
granted access to the essential facility. Regulation of both the access conditions and the
access price is then of prime importance in these industries.
The economics of eﬃcient access pricing (Laﬀont and Tirole 1994, Laﬀont and Tirole
2000, Armstrong, Doyle and Vickers, 1996) aim at deriving pricing schemes that maxi-
mize the total welfare and that guarantee that ﬁrms break even. This last point means
in particular that the owner of the essential input manages to cover all its cost with both
the access receipts and its downstream proﬁt. The eﬃcient access pricing approach pre-
scribes that, for each retail product, the associated Lerner index is inversely related to
the superelasticity of the product. This form of pricing is often referred to as Ramsey
pricing.
In this traditional approach, it is assumed that the regulator knows for all the market
segments which ﬁrms will operate. Consequently, Ramsey prices do not take into account
the impact of prices on the decision of ﬁrms to enter or not a particular segment of
the market. However, since the access price determines the overall proﬁtability of ﬁrms’
downstream operations, it must have an impact on the entry decision of ﬁrms in those
situations where the market structure is not taken as given.
In this paper we analyze the impacts of access prices on the entry decision of a ﬁrm
in the market. We derive Ramsey prices when the regulator is unaware of the operating
cost of a potential competitor of the incumbent ﬁrm (which is the owner of the essential
facility). In our model, the regulator sets ﬂat retail prices and access charge in order to
maximize social welfare. Consequently, the competitor’s decision of whether to enter the
market or not depends on the regulatory mechanism. A low access charge implies that a
ﬁrm is more likely to enter. The Ramsey prices corresponding to this situation are such
that the associated Lerner index for each retail product is inversely related to its modiﬁed
superelasticity. These modiﬁed superelasticities take into account the uncertainty over
the entry decision. For the products marketed by the entrant, there is an additional
1See Laﬀont and Tirole (2000, chapter 3).
2entry correction term in the Lerner index. Obviously, if entry always occurs, there is no
uncertainty over entry and our problem is equivalent to the traditional approach.
The main objective of this paper is to show how Ramsey prices should be adapted
when the market structure is not taken as given. To derive these optimal pricing schemes,
we make the following assumptions. First, we assume that the regulator has the power
to set the retail and access prices. This implies that the incumbent is totally passive: it
takes prices as given and supplies the quantities that exhaust the demand for its product
at these prices. The entrant is also passive with respect to its supply decision but it is
active with respect to its entry decision. The ﬁrm enters the market only if it can realize
a non-negative proﬁt. If the demand for its product is positive, entry occurs if the entrant
realizes a non negative margin on its sales. Clearly, this depends both on its private cost
and on the regulated prices and access charge. Second, we assume that the regulator
cannot extract the entrant’s private information on its cost by using a menu of prices and
access charges. Hence, we consider a uniform pricing scheme that applies indiﬀerently to
all types of the entrant. This is a source of ineﬃciency but it can be justiﬁed by the non-
discriminatory rule that a regulator often uses in designing access prices.2 What are the
exact implications of the non-discriminatory access requirement is beyond the objective
of this paper. The readers interested in this topic can consult the discussion in Laﬀont
and Tirole (2000, chapter 3), and Pittman (2004). Oﬀering diﬀerent self-selecting pricing
schemes is not per se a discriminatory practice since all ﬁrms have access to the same
pricing schemes. However, the German competitive authority (the Bundeskartellampt)
urged the owner of the rail infrastructure DB Netz to remove its TPS98 tariﬀ for access
because it was considered as discriminatory. The TPS98 consisted of two diﬀerent pricing
schemes: a two-part tariﬀ for larger carriers and a per-unit access charge for smaller
carriers (see Pittman, 2004). We leave aside this discussion and derive Ramsey prices
when the regulator is bound to use ﬂat prices and access charge.
The current model bears resemblance with few other earlier works in the literature on
access pricing. Lewis and Shappington (1999) consider mechanisms under price competi-
tion and asymmetric information where the entry decision is taken as given. Gautier and
Mitra (2003) consider an environment where the ﬁrms produce homogenous products and
compete sequentially in quantities. In their model, the market structure is endogenous
and they show that ineﬃcient entry can occur, i.e., a more cost eﬀective ﬁrm could not
enter the market or a less cost eﬀective ﬁrm may enter the market. As an alternative to
Ramsey pricing, the eﬃcient component pricing rule (ECPR) prescribes that the access
price should be equal to the incumbent’s opportunity cost for the retail services. With this
type of access pricing, (a) potential entrants can enter proﬁtably the market only if they
are more cost eﬃcient and (b) entry is neutral with respect to the incumbent’s proﬁt. In
2In the ongoing liberalization process in Europe, the European directives on telecommunica-
tion (90/388/EEC), electricity (96/92/EC), gas (2003/55/EC), rail (2002/14/EC) and postal services
(96/67/EC) impose that the essential facility owner grants access to competitors on the basis of a trans-
parent and non-discriminatory tariﬀ.
3this approach, entry is endogenous and the market is always served by the most eﬃcient
ﬁrm. Under some conditions the ECPR is equivalent to Ramsey pricing (see Laﬀont and
Tirole, 2000, Armstrong, Doyle and Vickers, 1996).
2 The Model
We consider an industry where two ﬁrms potentially operate in the downstream segments
of the market. The incumbent operator (I) produces two goods: a ﬁnal good in quantity
xI and a network good. The potential entrant (E) produces a ﬁnal good in quantity xE.
The two products are diﬀerentiated according to some quality parameters. Each ﬁrm uses
a unit of the network as an (essential) input to produce one unit of its ﬁnal good. There
are two types of cost associated with this network input: a ﬁxed cost k0 and a constant
marginal cost c0. The product of ﬁrm j involves a constant marginal cj for j = I, E. The
entrant pays a per unit price (the access charge) α for the use of the network.
The incumbent ﬁrm is either a duopolist (regime d) or a monopolist (regime m) in
the retail market depending upon whether E operates there or not. The demand for the
ﬁnal goods/services at prices (pI, pE) faced by I is given by:
xI =
(
xd
I(pI, pE), if E enters,
xm
I (pI, pE), if E does not enter.
The monopolist’s demand depends on pE due to a possible existence of limit price. The
demand faced by E is xE = xd
E(pI, pE). Let ηj and ηjk be the own and cross price
elasticities of xd
j (for j, k = I, E), respectively, and let ǫI be the own price elasticity of
xm
I . For a given pI, we have xm
I (pI, .) ≥ xd
I(pI, pE). A fraction of the consumers that
wishes to buy the product of E at price pE purchases from I at price pI when the entrant
stays out of the market. The gross consumer surplus from the downstream products is
given by U(xI, xE), where U is the indirect utility function. We assume that if ﬁrm j is
inactive, there are values of xj such that U(xj = 0, xk) > 0, for j, k = I, E.
The cost parameters (k0, c0, cI) of the incumbent ﬁrm are common knowledge. The
total costs that I incurs when it produces xI and its rival produces xE are given by
k0+c0(xI+xE)+cIxI. Entrant’s marginal cost cE is private information, and is distributed
according to a probability distribution function G(cE) on the interval [c, ¯ c]. Let g(cE) be
the continuous and diﬀerentiable density function associated with G(cE). The probability
distribution of cE is common knowledge and we assume that g(cE) > 0 for all cE.
We consider a fully regulated market where a utilitarian regulator sets the retail prices
pI and pE and the access charge α in order to maximise social welfare. We adopt the
account convention that the regulator receives the sales revenue of the incumbent and
makes monetary transfers to reimburse the costs of network. If E enters the market it
4pays the incumbent αxE for the use of the network good. Since the net utility of the
incumbent ﬁrm must be non-negative, the welfare maximisation problem induces prices
that are similar to Ramsey prices. In this environment, the only decision the potential
entrant takes is whether or not to supply the quantities xE(pI, pE) in the downstream
market.
Regulating retails prices in addition to the access conditions, is particularly important
when the ﬁrms are not competitive. Consider an entrant who possesses market power.
The regulator needs at least two instruments, namely, the retail prices (to regulate its
supply) and the access charge (to regulate its contribution to the network ﬁnancing), with
both instruments having an impact on the entry decision.3 Had the entrant belonged to
a competitive fringe, only one regulatory instrument (say, the access charge) would have
been suﬃcient.
Laﬀont and Tirole (2000) analyze the case where the ﬁrms are competitive. In their
framework, the ﬁrms realise zero proﬁt, and the regulator ﬁxes only the access price.
Under symmetric information, the problem is similar to the above case where the regulator
ﬁxes the retail and the access prices. This is no longer true under asymmetric information.
With competitive ﬁrms, E sets its price equal to its marginal cost: pE = cE + α, and
it enters the market if xd
E(pI, pE = cE + α) > 0, i.e., entry occurs if there is a positive
demand for the product of E. If the regulator sets retail and and access prices, entry
occurs if the entrant realises a non-negative proﬁt, i.e., if xE > 0 and (pE − cE − α) ≥ 0.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
The timing of the event, which is summarised in Figure 1, is as follows. The entrant
learns its cost cE privately. Then the regulator sets pI, pE and α. After being oﬀered the
mechanism (pI, pE, α), E decides on entry. If E decided to enter the market, each ﬁrm j
supplies in quantity xd
j(pI, pE) for j = I, E. Otherwise, I supplies in quantity xm
I (pI,.).
In the following sections we derive the Ramsey prices and the eﬃcient access charge
both under symmetric (when E’s cost is known to the regulator) and asymmetric infor-
mation.
3 Pricing under Symmetric Information
In this section we assume that cE is publicly known. First we consider the case of a
duopoly market. The utilitarian regulator maximises social welfare by setting the retail
3Alternatively, the regulator can use a two-part tariﬀ, where the variable part aims at regulating its
supply and the ﬁxed part aims at regulating its contribution to the network ﬁnancing. Gautier and Mitra
(2003), Lewis and Sappington (1996) use a two-part tariﬀ to regulate the behavior of a non-competitive
entrant.
5prices (pI, pE) and the access charge α. We have mentioned earlier that, without any loss
of generality, we assume that the regulator reimburses costs, receives the sales revenue of
the downstream product of the incumbent, and that the entrant pays the access charge
αxE directly to the incumbent ﬁrm. The regulator makes a transfer t to the incumbent
for the provision of the network good. The utility level of the incumbent ﬁrm is then
t + αxE. The proﬁt of the entrant is given by (pE − cE − α)xd
E. Public funds, which are
raised by distortionary taxes, have the shadow price 1 + λ (where λ > 0). Total funds to
be raised are given by:
t +
￿
c0(x
d
I + x
d
E) + k0
￿
− (pI − cI)x
d
I .
The consumers’ utility is given by:
V
d ≡ U(x
d
I, x
d
E) − pIx
d
I − pEx
d
E − (1 + λ)
￿
t + c0(x
d
I + x
d
E) + k0 − (pI − cI)x
d
I
￿
, (CSd)
where U(xd
I, xd
E) is the gross surplus from consuming the downstream products, which is
assumed to be concave. Hence, the regulator sets pI, pE and α in order to maximise the
following social welfare:
W
d ≡ U(x
d
I, x
d
E) −
￿
c0(x
d
I + x
d
E) + k0 + cI)x
d
I + cE)x
d
E
￿
−λ
￿
t + c0(x
d
I + x
d
E) + k0 − (pI − cI)x
d
I
￿
,
subject to the participation constraints of the ﬁrms:
t + αx
d
E ≥ 0, (PCI)
(pE − cE − α)x
d
E ≥ 0. (PCE)
Since public funds are costly, the participation constraint of the incumbent binds at the
optimum. Also, the access price α is set such a way in order that E earns zero proﬁt.
Taking these facts into account the objective function of the regulator reduces to:
U(x
d
I, x
d
E) − (1 + λ)
￿
k0 + (c0 + cI)x
d
I + (c0 + cE)x
d
E
￿
+ λ(pIx
d
I + pEx
d
E).
The solutions to the above maximisation problem can be summarised as follows.
Lj ≡
pj − c0 − cj
pj
=
λ
1 + λ
1
ˆ ηj
, for j = I, E, (1)
where
ˆ ηj ≡
ηj(ηjηk − ηjkηkj)
ηjηk + ηjηjk
, for j, k = I, E.
The above expression ˆ ηj is the superelasticity of good j = I, E, which takes into account
the fact that the two ﬁrms sell diﬀerentiated products in the retail market. Under the
assumption of substitutability (ηjk > 0 for j, k = I, E) we have ˆ ηj < ηj. Further, the
Lerner index Lj of ﬁrm j is inversely related to its superelasticity.
6Next, consider the case of a monopoly market, i.e., the incumbent faces no rival in the
downstream segment of the market. In this case the total funds to be raised are given by:
t + c0x
m
I + k0 − (pIx
m
I − cIx
m
I ).
Hence, the net consumers’ surplus is given by:
V
m ≡ U(x
m
I , 0) − pIx
m
I − (1 + λ)(t + c0x
m
I + k0 + cIx
m
I − pIx
m
I ), (CSm)
The utilitarian regulator designs the mechanism (pI, pE, α) to solve the following social
welfare:
W
m ≡ V
m + t,
subject to t ≥ 0.
Again the net transfer t must be equal to zero for the participation constraint of the
incumbent to be binding. Hence the regulator’s objective function reduces to:
U(x
m
I , 0) + λpIx
m
I − (1 + λ)(c0 + cI)x
m
I − (1 + λ)k0 ,
The solution to the above maximisation problem can be summarised as follows.
LI ≡
pI − c0 − cI
pI
=
λ
1 + λ
1
ǫI
. (2)
In this case the Lerner index of the monopolist is inversely related to the own price
elasticity of xm
I .
Now we would like to see if, under symmetric information, entry is socially eﬃcient.
In other words, we would look for a cut-oﬀ level of marginal cost of E such that if cE is
diﬀerent from this cut-oﬀ level, maximum social welfare associated to duopoly is diﬀerent
from that in the case of monopoly. This is summarised in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 There exists a level of marginal cost c∗ of E below which entry is always
socially optimal.
Proof Let W SI,d(cE) and W SI,m be the maximum value functions of the above two
maximisation problems, respectively. Notice that W SI,m is independent of cE. Now by
Envelope theorem,
dW SI,d(cE)
dcE
= −(1 + λ)x
d
E
Given that λ ≥ 0 and xd
E > 0, the above expression is strictly negative, i.e., W SI,d(cE)
is strictly decreasing in cE. Now deﬁne c∗ such that W SI,d(c∗) = W SI,m. Also, since the
function is strictly decreasing, we must have W SI,d(c) > W SI,d(¯ c). Such c∗ exists under
7the assumption that W SI,d(c) ≥ W SI,m ≥ W SI,d(¯ c).4 ￿
In the next section we analyse the eﬃcient pricing under asymmetric information, i.e.,
when the marginal cost of the entrant is not known to the regulator.
4 Pricing under Asymmetric Information
In this section we assume that E learns its marginal cost privately before the regula-
tor designs the mechanism (pI, pE, α), although the G(cE), the distribution of entrant’s
marginal cost is common knowledge. In this case the regulator maximises the sum of
the social welfare under each kind of market structure, namely duopoly and monopoly.
Notice that, after observing the regulatory mechanism, E makes the decision on entry.
It enters if Πd
E ≡ (pE − cE − α)xd
E ≥ 0. Deﬁne ˆ c such that pE − ˆ c − α = 0. Given that
xd
E(pI, pE) > 0, E enters only if cE ≤ ˆ c. Thus, given the mechanism, ˆ c, and hence the
market structure (duopoly or monopoly) are endogenous. Notice that with probability
G(ˆ c) the market structure is a duopoly, and the incumbent is a monopolist with the com-
plementary probability. Under the assumption of unknown marginal cost, the regulator
then solves the following maximisation problem:
max
{pI,pE,α}
Z ˆ c
c
W
d dG(cE) +
Z ¯ c
ˆ c
W
m dG(cE),
subject to
G(ˆ c)(t + αx
d
E) + (1 − G(ˆ c))t ≥ 0, (PCAI
I )
α = pE − ˆ c, (PCAI
E )
The ﬁrst constraint is the participation constraint of the incumbent, which implies that
the expected utility of I must be non-negative. Because public funds are costly, this
constraint binds at the optimum. The second constraint is the “zero-proﬁt” condition
of the type-ˆ c of E. As ˆ c is endogenous the superelasticities must be modiﬁed in order
to take the impact of the mechanism on entry decision into account. Let us ﬁrst deﬁne
the “modiﬁed superelasticities” for the retail products. Let the average demands be
¯ xI = G(ˆ c)xd
I + (1 − G(ˆ c))xm
I and ¯ xE = G(ˆ c)xd
E, respectively. Thus we can also deﬁne
average elasticities as follows.
¯ ηj = −
∂¯ xj
∂pj
pj
¯ xj
, for j = I, E,
¯ ηjk =
∂¯ xj
∂pk
pk
¯ xj
, for j, k = I, E, and j  = k.
4We might have W SI,m > WSI,d(c). In this case one may choose c∗ = c, and hence entry is never
eﬃcient. On the other hand, if W SI,d(¯ c) > WSI,m we can choose c∗ = ¯ c, and hence entry is always
eﬃcient. But we concentrate on the most interesting case where c∗ ∈ (c, ¯ c).
8Now we deﬁne the following modiﬁed superelasticities:
ˆ η
G
j =
¯ ηj (¯ ηj¯ ηk − ¯ ηjk¯ ηkj)
¯ ηj¯ ηk + ¯ ηj¯ ηjk
, for j, k = I, E, and j  = k.
Notice that the above modiﬁed superelasticities are similar to that in case of symmetric
information. Under unknown cost, the terms ηj and ηjk in ˆ ηj are replaced by ¯ ηj and
¯ ηjk, respectively. The modiﬁed superelasticities depend on the entry decision of E (since
it depends on G(ˆ c), the number of cost types that enter the downstream market). In
the following proposition we show that the modiﬁed superelasticity of a ﬁrm j can be
expressed as a weighted sum of ˆ ηj and its value at G(ˆ c) = 0.
Proposition 2 The modiﬁed superelasticity of the product of each ﬁrm can be written
in the following way.
(a) ˆ η
G
I = qI ˆ ηI + (1 − qI)ǫI,
(b) ˆ η
G
E = qE ˆ ηE + (1 − qE)rηE,
where
qI ≡
G(ˆ c)(ηE + ηIE)
¯ xI(¯ ηE + ¯ ηIE)
, qE ≡
G(ˆ c)(ηI + ηEI)
¯ xI(¯ ηI + ¯ ηEI)
and r ≡
ǫI
ǫI + ηEI
.
Proof First, notice that ¯ ηI and ¯ ηIE can be expressed as follows.
¯ ηI =
G(.)xd
I
¯ xI
ηI +
(1 − G(.))xm
I
¯ xI
ǫI,
¯ ηIE =
G(.)xd
I
¯ xI
ηI.
Also notice that ¯ ηE = ηE and ¯ ηEI = ηEI. Substitute the above in the formulas of ˆ ηG
I and
ˆ ηG
E to get the results. ￿
From the above proposition it is easy to see that ˆ ηj can be obtained by evaluating ˆ ηG
j
at ˆ c = ¯ c, i.e., in the case where the optimal mechanism is such that all cost types of E
can enter the retail market proﬁtably. Also, since the products are substitutes (¯ ηjk > 0)
we have ˆ ηG
j < ¯ ηj for j = I, E. Also it is very easy to see that ˆ ηG
I is monotone in the
probability of entry, G.5 This fact is summarised in the following proposition and in
Figure 2.
Proposition 3 For ǫI > (<)ηI, ˆ ηG
I is monotonically decreasing (increasing) in the prob-
ability of entry.
5Similar conclusion can be drawn also for the entrant ﬁrm.
9Proof It is easy to check that, given ηjk > 0, ǫI > (<)ηI is a necessary and suﬃcient
condition for
∂ˆ ηG
I
∂G < (>)0. ￿
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
In Figure 2 notice that ˆ ηI < ηI and ˆ ηG
I < ¯ ηI , since the goods are imperfect substitutes.
Now we analyse the welfare maximisation problem when the marginal cost of E is un-
known. In the following proposition we describe the pair (pI, pE) as part of the optimal
mechanism. These prices are modiﬁed Ramsey prices which takes the endogeneity of the
market structure into account. They are eﬃcient in the sense that they maximise social
welfare.
Proposition 4 The optimal retail prices are given by:
LI ≡
pI − c0 − cI
pI
=
λ
1 + λ
1
ˆ ηG
I
,
LE ≡
pE − c0 − cE
pE
=
λ
1 + λ
1
ˆ ηG
E
+ Q(ˆ c),
where Q(ˆ c) ≡ 1
pE(1+λ) (λ(ˆ c − cE) − (E[cE|cE ≤ ˆ c] − cE)) with E being the expectation op-
erator.
Proof See Appendix B. ￿
The Lerner index of the incumbent is similar to that derived in the symmetric infor-
mation case. This is inversely proportional to the modiﬁed superelasticity of its product.
When the marginal cost of E is private information, a similar regulatory mechanism fails
to perfectly regulate entry. Hence, LI depends on G(ˆ c) through the modiﬁed superelas-
ticity. We have already established that ˆ ηG
I can be expressed as an average of ˆ ηI and
ǫI. This implies that for G(.) = 1 and G(.) = 0, we can obtain LI equivalent to that in
equations (1) and (2), respectively.
In case of E, its Lerner index is a sum of two terms. First, it involves a modiﬁed
Ramsey term implying that LE is inversely related to ˆ ηG
E. Second, since the entry decision
of the ﬁrm cannot be perfectly regulated, there is an additional “entry correction” term.
This depends on the diﬀerence between ˆ c and the true realisation of cE, and the diﬀerence
between “expected type” that enters in equilibrium and the true realisation of cE.
The optimal access charge α is determined from the remaining ﬁrst order condition
of the maximisation programme. Firm E decides to enter after observing the mechanism
(pI, pE, α). All cost types of the entrant with marginal cost cE ≤ ˆ c enter since these
types earn non-negative proﬁts. Hence, the optimal mechanism inﬂuences ˆ c, which is
10consequently determined endogenously from the condition: α = pE + ˆ c. Using this, the
optimal access charge can also be written as the following:
α − c0
α + ˆ c
=
λ
1 + λ
1
ˆ ηG
E
+ Q(ˆ c).
In the standard models of eﬃcient access pricing as in Laﬀont and Tirole (2000), when the
cost of the entrant is unknown to the regulator, this ﬁrm is oﬀered a menu of contracts
(pI(cE), pE(cE), α(cE)). Consequently, entry and hence the market structure are perfectly
regulated. There is no entry decision per se made by E. In the above mentioned models
the mechanism (pI(cE), pE(cE), α(cE)) is eﬃcient in the sense that it maximises social
welfare for a given market structure. On the other hand, the “eﬃcient component pricing
rule”, which is based on contestable markets, is concerned with eﬃcient entry. In the
current model, we set up a model similar to Laﬀont and Tirole (1994) in order to derive
welfare maximising retail and access prices that also take eﬃcient entry decision into
account. Our optimal mechanism gives rise to modiﬁed Ramsey prices.
5 Entry and Social Optimum
Now we analyse how does the entry decision, or equivalently ˆ c, compare with the socially
optimal entry level. In other words, we would like to see whether, under asymmetric
information, there is ineﬃcient entry compared to the social optimum. There are two
possible forms of ineﬃciency: “excess entry” under asymmetric information if ˆ c > c∗, and
“too little entry” if ˆ c < c∗.
In a related work, Gautier and Mitra (2003) ﬁnd that (a) under asymmetric informa-
tion entry is generically ineﬃcient and (b) that both types of ineﬃciencies are possible.
Thus, there is no systematic bias toward any particular form of ineﬃciency. In more
speciﬁc contexts i.e., using speciﬁc assumptions on the distribution of the entrant’s cost
parameter, Gautier (2006) and Bloch and Gautier (2006) identify situations where one
type of ineﬃcient entry is not possible. Gautier (2006) observes that there is too little
entry with both two-part and single tariﬀs for the access charge, the latter generating
more entry. Bloch and Gautier (2006) study the choice between access and bypass as a
function of the regulated access price. They identify a situation where, under asymmetric
information, excessive bypass is possible, while excessive access does not emerge.
In our model, the cut-oﬀ entry point ˆ c is found by solving the ﬁrst order condition
of the maximisation problem in Section 4. As it clearly appears in this condition, the
entry cut-oﬀ depends on the distribution of the entrant’s cost parameter. Therefore,
two diﬀerent distributions are likely to generate two diﬀerent cut-oﬀ points and entry is
presumably not always eﬃcient.
We can however identify a situation in which the cut-oﬀ entry point is identical under
11both symmetric and asymmetric information. As a matter of fact, if for all possible values
of cE, under symmetric information a duopoly is associated with a lower welfare level than
a monopoly, there will be a total entry ban under symmetric information.
Proposition 5 If c∗ ≤ c, then ˆ c = c
Beyond that, we cannot identify a systematic bias in the entry decision. The following
numerical examples illustrate this point. In order to see this we consider (inverse) demand
functions for the retail goods of the following form:
pj = 1 − x
d
j −
xd
k
2
, for j, k = I, E, and when there are two ﬁrms,
pI = 1.1 − x
m
I , when there is only the incumbent,
With the above demand functions the gross consumer surplus under duopoly and monopoly
are respectively given by:
U(x
d
I, x
d
E) = (x
d
I + x
d
E) −
1
2
￿
(x
d
I)
2 + (x
d
E)
2￿
−
1
2
x
d
I x
d
E,
U(x
m
I , 0) = 1.1x
m
I −
1
2
(x
m
I )
2.
We further assume that λ = 0.2, c0 = 0, cI = 0.12, and k0 = 0.01. In what follows, we
consider two examples (two diﬀerent sets of values of the parameters) in order to compute
c∗ and ˆ c. Under asymmetric information, if we consider that cE is uniformly distributed
on the interval [c, c] i.e., g(cE) = 1
c−c, diﬀerent boundaries for this interval would generate
diﬀerent cut-oﬀ points inducing both types of ineﬃciencies.
Example 1 The marginal cost of E, cE is distributed uniformly over [0.15, 0.20]. In
this case the eﬃcient entry point under symmetric information is given by c∗ ≃ 0.18. And
the cut-oﬀ point under unknown marginal cost is given by ˆ c ≃ 0.17. In this case there is
“too little entry”.
Example 2 Now assume that cE is distributed uniformly over [0.15, 0.25]. The eﬃ-
cient entry point under symmetric information is given by c∗ ≃ 0.18. But the cut-oﬀ
point under unknown marginal cost is given by ˆ c ≃ 0.22. In this case there is “excess
entry”.
From the above two examples we see that there is no clear ranking between c∗ and ˆ c.
The ﬁrst example suggests that, under asymmetric information, there is insuﬃcient entry
compared to the social optimum. On the other hand, in the second example we ﬁnd that
there is excess entry into the downstream market compared to the socially optimum level.
126 Concluding Remarks
When the regulation of a potential entrant with unknown cost is under consideration,
traditional Ramsey pricing formula does not take into account the impacts of regulatory
mechanisms on the entry into the retail market. On the other hand, popular competition
policies assert that access to essential inputs should be non-discriminatory (i.e., a common
access fee for all types of users of the network facility). In this paper we show that a non-
discriminatory mechanism has signiﬁcant impact on the entry decision of the rival ﬁrm.
We consider a regulatory environment where the retail prices and the access charge are set
by a utilitarian regulator. The derivation of eﬃcient access and retail prices must make
use of a modiﬁed Ramsey pricing rule, which takes the impact of the mechanism on entry
into account, instead of the traditional one. Hence, given the regulatory mechanism, the
entry into the downstream market, and hence the market structure are endogenous. These
depend crucially on the non-discriminatory regulatory mechanism in which the regulator
cannot perfectly control the entry into the retail market.
In the current paper we ﬁrst show that eﬃcient retail and access prices under sym-
metric information coincide with the traditional Ramsey prices as derived in Laﬀont and
Tirole (1994). Next, in the case where the entrant’s cost is unknown, the eﬃcient retail
and access prices are modiﬁed Ramsey prices. In this regard we derive modiﬁed supere-
lasticities of the retail goods which take the impact of the regulatory mechanism on the
entry decision into account. Finally, we show that, under asymmetric information, there
might occur “excess” or “too little” entry compared to the social optimum, i.e., there is
no systematic bias towards any particular type of ineﬃcient (due to private information)
entry decision.
The above analyses are done under the assumption that the potential entrant posseses
market power instead of being part of a competitive fringe. When the entrant is assumed
to be competitive, one could draw conclusions that are similar to the ones found in the
current paper. An interesting extension of the current model would be to consider a
partially regulated industry where the regulator only designs the access fee (possibly a
two-part tariﬀ), and the ﬁrms compete in a Bertrand fashion in the downstream market.
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A Pricing under Symmetric Information
When the marginal cost of the entrant is common knowledge, the regulator solves two
separate maximisation problems in order to design the optimal mechanism (pI, pE, α):
(a) when E enters the market, i.e., the retail market is a duopoly, and (b) when the
incumbent is a monopolist. First we consider the case of a duopoly market, where the
regulator maximises the following social welfare:
W
d ≡ U(x
d
I, x
d
E) − pIx
d
I − pEx
d
E −
(1 + λ)
￿
t + c0(x
d
I + x
d
E) + k0 − (pI − cI)x
d
I
￿
+
[t + αx
d
E] +
￿
(pE − c0 − cE)x
d
E
￿
,
subject to
t + αx
d
E ≥ 0, (PCI)
(pE − cE − α)x
d
E ≥ 0. (PCE)
It is easy to check that, at the optimum, both the constraints are satisﬁed with equality.
If one incorporates these into the objective function, that reduces to:
U(x
d
I, x
d
E) + λ(pIx
d
I + pEx
d
E) − (1 + λ)(c0 + cI)x
d
I − (1 + λ)(c0 + cE)x
d
E − (1 + λ)k0.
The ﬁrst order conditions with respect to pI and pE are given, respectively by:
(pI − c0 − cI)
∂xd
I
∂pI
+ (pE − c0 − cE)
∂xd
E
∂pI
= −
λxd
I
1 + λ
, (3)
(pI − c0 − cI)
∂xd
I
∂pE
+ (pE − c0 − cE)
∂xd
E
∂pE
= −
λxd
E
1 + λ
. (4)
Let us deﬁne by
ηj ≡ −
∂xd
j
∂pj
pj
xd
j
and ηjk ≡ −
∂xd
j
∂pk
pk
xd
j
for j, k = I, E and j  = k,
Lj ≡
pj − c0 − cj
pj
for j = I, E.
Equations (3) and (4) can be rearranged to give
Lj =
λ
1 + λ
1
ˆ ηj
, for j = I, E,
17where
ˆ ηj ≡
ηj(ηjηk − ηjkηkj)
ηjηk + ηjηjk
, for j, k = I, E.
The optimal access charge is given by:
α = pE − cE.
Now consider the case when the incumbent is a monopolist in the retail market. The
regulator then designs the mechanism (pI, pE, α) to maximise social welfare:
W
m ≡ U(x
m
I , 0) + λpIx
m
I − (1 + λ)(c0 + cI)x
m
I − (1 + λ)k0 − λt,
subject to t ≥ 0.
The last inequality is the participation constraint of the incumbent, which binds at
the optimum. Hence, the objective function of the regulator reduces to:
W
m ≡ U(x
m
I , 0) + λpIx
m
I − (1 + λ)(c0 + cI)x
m
I − (1 + λ)k0.
The ﬁrst order condition with respect to pI is given by:
(pI − c0 − cI)
∂xm
I
∂pI
= −
λxm
I
1 + λ
. (5)
Let us deﬁne by
ǫI ≡ −
∂xm
I
∂pI
pI
xm
I
.
Equation (5) can be rearranged to give
LI =
λ
1 + λ
1
ǫI
.
The above is the standard “inverse elasticity” rule of a monopoly ﬁrm. Notice that the
Lerner indices of the ﬁrms are inversely related to the superelasticities in duopoly.
B Pricing under Asymmetric Information
When the marginal cost of the entrant is unknown to the regulator he designs a mechanism
(pI, pE, α) in order to maximise the expected social welfare. Firm E decides to enter
the market after observing the mechanism. We have already mentioned that all cost
types of E that earn non-negative proﬁts will enter the market. Deﬁne ˆ c such that
pE − ˆ c − α = 0. Hence, any type cE ≤ ˆ c will enter the market. Thus with probability
18G(ˆ c) the market structure is a duopoly, and the incumbent is a monopolist with the
complementary probability. Hence, the social welfare in this case is given by:
ˆ W ≡
Z ˆ c
c
W
d dG(cE) +
Z ¯ c
ˆ c
W
m dG(cE)
=
Z ˆ c
c
[U(x
d
I, x
d
E) − pIx
d
I − pEx
d
E − (1 + λ)
￿
t + c0(x
d
I + x
d
E) + k0 − (pI − cI)x
d
I
￿
+
(t + αx
d
E) + (pE − cE − α)x
d
E] dG(cE)+
Z ¯ c
ˆ c
[U(x
m
I , 0) − pIx
m
I − (1 + λ)(t + c0x
m
I + k0 + cIx
m
I − pIx
m
I ) + t] dG(cE).
When the market is a duopoly, the utility of I is t+αxd
I, and it is t in case of monopoly.
The regulator designs the optimal mechanism that guarantees non-negative expected util-
ity to I (the participation constraint of this ﬁrm). Hence, the utilitarian regulator solves
the following maximisation problem:
max
{pI,pE,α}
ˆ W,
subject to
G(ˆ c)(t + αx
d
E) + (1 − G(ˆ c))t ≥ 0, (PCAI
I )
α = pE − ˆ c, (PCAI
E )
Notice that for the regulator choosing α is equivalent to choosing ˆ c = pE −α. Now deﬁne
by
ˆ W
d ≡ U(x
d
I, x
d
E) + λpI x
d
I + λpE x
d
E −
(1 + λ)(c0 + cI)x
d
I − (1 + λ)(c0 + ˆ c)x
d
E − (1 + λ)k0,
and H(ˆ c) ≡
Z ˆ c
c
G(t)dt.
The participation constraint of the incumbent binds at the optimum. Incorporating both
the constraints into the objective function, we can reduce the regulator’s problem as
follows:
max
{pI,pE,α}
G(ˆ c) ˆ W
d + (1 − G(ˆ c))W
m + xEH(ˆ c).
Also deﬁne ¯ xI ≡ G(.)xd
I +(1−G(.))xm
I and ¯ xE ≡ G(.)xd
E . The ﬁrst order conditions with
respect to pI, pE and ˆ c are given, respectively by:
(1 + λ)
￿
(pI − c0 − cI)
∂¯ xI
∂pI
+ (pE − c0 − ˆ c)
∂¯ xE
∂pI
￿
+ λ¯ xI + H(ˆ c)
∂xd
E
∂pI
= 0, (6)
(1 + λ)
￿
(pI − c0 − cI)G(ˆ c)
∂xd
I
∂pE
+ (pE − c0 − ˆ c)
∂¯ xE
∂pE
￿
+ λ¯ xE + H(ˆ c)
∂xd
E
∂pE
= 0, (7)
h
ˆ W
d − W
m
i
− λx
d
E h(ˆ c) = 0, (8)
19where h(.) is the hazard rate associated to the distribution function G(.), which is assumed
to be monotonically increasing. Rearranging equations (6) and (7) we get
LI ≡
pI − c0 − cI
pI
=
λ
1 + λ
1
ˆ ηG
I
,
LE ≡
pE − c0 − cE
pE
=
λ
1 + λ
1
ˆ ηG
E
+ Q(ˆ c),
where
ˆ η
G
j =
¯ ηj (¯ ηj¯ ηk − ¯ ηjk¯ ηkj)
¯ ηj¯ ηk + ¯ ηj¯ ηjk
, for j, k = I, E, and j  = k.
and Q(ˆ c) ≡
1
pE(1 + λ)
(λ(ˆ c − cE) − (E[cE|cE ≤ ˆ c] − cE)
=
1
pE(1 + λ)
￿
λ(ˆ c − cE) −
￿
H(ˆ c)
G(ˆ c)
− cE
￿￿
.
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